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LEGAL DOCTRINE, WAR POWER, AND JAPANESE
EVACUATION
By RICHARD F WOLFSON1
In Anglo-American jursprudence appellate courts not only
determine the disposition of a case but also describe in written
opinions the factual background and legal reasoning which, in
theory, resulted in the actual decision. Every opinion so ren-
dered becomes precedent, and upon this concept of precedent
has been established our hierarchy of case-law
But precedent, if running riot, tends to have a reactionary
rather than a stabilizing influence.i Doctrine evolved in an era
of different social needs and beliefs is repeated by judges upon
whom the words, having lost their traditional implications, have
little behavioral effect. Conventional verbalizations are, in prac-
tice, rarely applied. An example is "Cuirs est solum, eius est
usque ad coelum et ad infernos" in the law of property
Yet courts do show a certain minimum concern with sym-
metrization between what is done and what is said. Now and
then the Supreme Court disapproves a previous decision,2 no
doubt feeling that the statement of law there presented and the
determination now made are in hopeless contradiction. The
usual practice, however, has been to refrain from overmling
old cases, insofar as possible. It is the assumption of this article
that it would be a "healthier" procedure 'for courts more fre-
quently to overrule cases out of line, for although the life of the
law has been experience, not logic, nevertheless if, through a
reexamination of legal experience, a measure of symmetry can
be achieved, then by writing into the law the newly discovered
harmonization of past and present or of word and act the ap-
* S.B., Harvard, 1942 (as of 1943) Yale Law School.
See ALEXANDER, OUR AGE OF UNREASON (1942) 145: "A perform-
ance found satisfactory in the past must now be foregone and re-
placed. This means effort, and the organism disposed to save its
energy on the principle of economy resists the change. This energy-
saving principle we shall call 'inertia. It is one of the fundamental
characteristics of living organisms and is both the key to under-
standing all morbid phenomena and the basis of social disintegration
through cultural lag."
I The disapproval of a previous "case" means, of course, the dis-
approval of the opinion there written, since the actual holding,
whether plaintiff or defendant wins, can no longer be changed.
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plication of precedent will more nearly coincide with the ortho-
dox concept of precedent. Specifically, it will be argued that
ex parte Millifan,3 a milepost in our constitutional development,
has already been disapproved sub silentw and that in a case
dealing with the constitutionality of Japanese evacuation. Kore-
matsw v United States,4 which should soon come before the
United States Supreme Court, this disapproval ought to be made
explicit. 'loreover, it is proposed that the traditional theory
of war power expounded in the Milligan case and the subsidiary
theory, which differentiates between martial law and other types
of wartime governmental control, be abolished and a new verbal
standard be substituted in their place.
To understand the significance of the Korematsu case a
brief review of the legal history of the curfew and evacuation
orders imposed on all Japanese, citizens and aliens alike, is neces-
sary 5 Three months after the outbreak of war,0 the President
issued Executive Order 9066 authorizing the Secretary of War
or subordinate military commanders to establish military areas
"from which any or all persons may be excluded.'' Under this
blanket authority, Lieutenant General De Witt, then charged
with the Western Defense Command, issued proclamations creat-
ing zones in which Japanese-Americans were later to be re-
stricted.s At the same time, the niset, American citizens of Japa-
nese descent were requested to move into the continental interior
or be subjected to stringent military regulations. 9 Before further
restrictive measures were undertaken, however, Congress, at the
34 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1870)
140 F (2d) 289 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) Cf. Korematsu v United
States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943)
'See also Alexandre, The Nisez-A Casualty of World War II
(1943) 28 CORN. L. Q. 385, 403; Freeman, Genealogy, Evacuation, and
Law (1943) 28 CORN. L. Q. 414; Note (1943) 11 GEo. WAsR. L. REv.
482; Note (1943) 17 TULANE L. REv. 652; Recent Decision (1942) 41
MicH. L. REv. 522; Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1316.
'See Hirabayashi v United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93-94 .(1943) for
Chief Justice Stone's review of the military history in the war with
Japan during this period.
'7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942)
"7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 2405 (1942)
"See Brief for the Government in Hirabayashi v United States,
No. 10,308 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 7-8, 9-10. It may be remarked, how-
ever, that due to the inflamed state of public opinion it would have
been unwise, if not dangerous, for any person of Japanese racial
characteristics to have moved to a foreign section of the country.
The alternative, therefore, does not appear to have been real. But cf.
Honda v People, 141 P (2d) 178 (Colo. 1943)
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request of the War Department, enacted Public Law 503 ratify-
ing the previous Executive Order and sanctioning future limi-
tations upon the Japanese-American population.' 0 Immediately
thereafter, this national-racial group was subjected to an eight
o'clock curfew;11 and a gradual evacuation under a series of
Civilian Exclusion Orders was begun,12 inset and aliens being
transported to detention camps. 13
In two cases arising under the curfew and evacuation orders,
voluntary violations occurred in order to test their constitution-
ality Hirabayashi, a nsses with a record of national loyalty,
was convicted and sentenced to concurrently running three
month terms. The District Court, in its opinion, broadly ap-
proved the evacuation.14 Yasui, another citizen, similarly tested
the curfew 15 Both cases on appeal were certified by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court ;16 three ques-
tions were asked-the constitutionality of Public Law 503, of
the curfew, and of the Civilian Exclusion Orders.
17
" 56 Stat. 173 (1942) 18 U.S.C. § 97(a) (Supp. 1943) "That
whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act m any
military area or military zone prescribed under the authority of an
Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by
any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary
to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary
to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander,
shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the
existence of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both. for each offense."
n 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942)
'7 Fed. Reg. 2581 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg. 3944 (1942) 7 Fed. Reg.
3945 (1942)
"See Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (1942),
which prohibited any internee leaving without military permission.
"United States v Hirabayashi, 46 F Supp. 40 (W D. Wash.
1942)
"United States v Yasui, 48 F Supp. 40 (W D. Wash. 1942)
Judge Fee, although he rejected the view that any classification of
citizens according to race could be constitutionally valid, found,
nevertheless, that the defendant had by his registering as a propa-
ganda agent for Japan and by his employment at the Japanese
Consulate General in Chicago effectively deprived himself of Ameri-
can citizenship. Cf. Yasui v United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943)
Yet there can be no doubt of Yasui's loyalty He was a second
lieutenant m the United States Army Reserves, a member of the
Oregon bar, and resigned from his position with the Japanese Con-
sulate the day war was declared. His test case was undertaken after
consultation with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
1 This decision is unreported; it is Hirabayashi v United States,
No. 10,308 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943)
"Judge Denman dissented from the certification of these
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The Supreme Court,lS in an opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Stone, and with separate concurrences by Justices Douglas,
Mlurphy, and Rutledge, held constitutional the curfew, but re-
fused to consider the issue of evacuation, using the excuse that
because Hirabayashi had been sentenced to concurrently running
prison terms on the two counts of violation of the exclusion or
ders and the curfew orders, "it will be unnecessary to consider
questions raised with respect to the first count if we find that the
conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew order,
must-be sustained."19 It furthermore limited the general issue
to "whether, acting in cooperation Congress and the Executive
have constitutional authority to impose the curfew restric-
tion ,, 20 and refused to consider the issues of martial law,
the breadth of executive authority, legislative delegation, or the
general scope of the war powers, all of which had been argued by
litigants or by lower courts.
It seems highly probable that the Court refused to pass upon
the constitutionality of the evacuation orders because of grave
doubts as to their validity There are many statements, espe-
cially in the concurring opinions, which may be taken as indi-
cating an opposite holding or at least much more serious con-
sideration if the problem of evacuation or continued enforced
detention were squarely before the Court. Typical are "Deten-
tion for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of
ancestry is another. ''21, " where the peril is great and the
time short, temporary treatment on a group basis may be the
only practicable expedient whatever the ultimate percentage of
those retained for cause." '2 2 , "But if it were plain that no
machinery was available whereby the individual could demon-
strate his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified, questions
of a more serious character would be presented.' 23, "When the
danger is past, the restrictions imposed on them should be
promptly removed and their freedom of action restored.' '24 It
questions to the Supreme Court. His dissent, previously unreported,
is printed as Exhibit A to his concurring opinion in Korematsu v
United States, 140 F (2d) 300-304 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943)
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
Id. at 85.
-'Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 108.
2Id. at 107.
:'Id. at 109.
Id. at 114.
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was hoped, however, that future administrative action which
would free the proven loyal from concentration camps would
moot the issue.
2 5
The preliminary question before the Court was whether
under any circumstances discrimination by the federal govern-
ment upon the basis of origin is justifiable. The answer was in
the affirmative, although at least one justice took cognizance of
the fact that never before had the Supreme Court permitted the
privileges of citizenship to depend upon ethnic affiliations. 20
And apparently in only one case since the Civil War has any
federal statute based upon racial considerations been sustained,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Wall v.
Oyster 27 upheld segregation of Negro and Caucasian children in
District of Columbia schools. 28 Nor can it be doubted that in
the Hirabayasht case, although the restrictions were due not to
considerations of race but general loyalty, yet the result was to
single out one national group for regulation. 29
Because of the type of question presented, the further issue
arose as to what standard should be applied. United States v
Wong Kim ArkVo had held that under the theory of jus soli all
persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States are
citizens thereof. And although there have been recent attempts
to reverse that decision, 31 its binding effect cannot be ques-
Cf. Zimmerman v. Walker, 132 F (2d) 442 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942),
cert. denied on the ground that the cause had become moot, 319 U.S.
744 (1943) (martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
in Hawaii on December 7, 1941)
That the issue is not yet moot, see N.Y. Times, January 8, 1944,
p. 12, col. 5.
Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said: "Today
is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we have sustained a sub-
stantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens of the United
States based upon accident or ancestry" Hirabayashi v United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943)
36 App. D.C. 50, 54 (1910)
'Cf. United States v New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 165 Fed. 742,
745-46 (C.C.D. Mass. 1908), but cf. Allen v Oklahoma City 175
Okla. 421, 52 P (2d) 1054 (1935) (Martial law may not be employed
to enforce racial segregation) See also Brief for Appellant, Hira-
bayashi v United States, No. 10,308 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 13-16.
See McWilliams, Japanese Out of California (1942) 106 NEw
REPUBL c 456, 457" " if American-born Japanese are to be evacu-
ated en masse, but no such action is taken involving citizens of
German or Italian ancestry, then obviously one group of citizens
will have been discrimiated against solely on the basis of race."
169 U.S. 649 (1898)
"See 88 Cong. Rec. 2779-2781 (1943) for the speech of Senator
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tioned.3 2 Here for the first time was a federal discrimination
against certain citizens upon a group basis. What the Govern-
ment wanted the Court to say was, in effect, that although the
Wong Kim Ark decision had made all American-born persons
citizens, nevertheless neither in the Constitution nor in that case
had there been any assurance of equal treatment at all times.
But even if the Government's contention were accepted, some
standard determinative of the permissible limits of discrimma-
tory treatment seemed to be necessary All previous tests such
as "a clear and present danger" 3 3 or "a reasonable apprehen-
sion to organized government" 3 4 had been developed to protect
the individual.3 5
Yet the majority opinion did not evolve any new formula for
examining group discriminations. Indeed, the same words could
have been used had the case before the Court been that of dis-
crimination against an individual citizen or against the entire
population, Occidental and Oriental, of the Pacific area. Time-
honored truisms were reiterated-the war power is "the power
to wage war successfully,' '3 there had been a basis for rea-
sonably prudent men to conclude, at the time, that the Western
states were in danger of invasion. 3 7 The regulation was per
Steward favoring depriving American-born Japanese of their citi-
zenship. "I refer to the Wong Kim Ark case. I think that
decision was wrong in theory and in reason, and ought to be over-
ruled or reversed." See also Hearings before the Select Committee
Investigating National Defense Migration, Part 29, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) 11085 for a statement of the California Joint Immi-
gration Committee: " a grave mistake was made when citizen-
ship was granted to all born here, regardless of fitness or desire for
such citizenship. Another grave mistake was the granting of citi-
zenship to the Negroes after the Civil War."
See Regan v. King, 49 F Supp. 222 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd,
134 F (2d) 413 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) aff'd, 319 U.S. 753 (1943)
'Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) Pierce v.
United States, 252 U.S. 239, 269 (1920), Schaefer v United States,
251 U.S. 466, 493-95 (1920), Abrams v United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919)
14Herndon v Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937)
"It has been suggested that the standard for military restric-
tions on civilians be that of a "grave potential danger." See Com-
ment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1316, 1330,n.90.
IHughes, The Scope of War Powers under the Constitution
(1917) 42 A.B.A.R. 232, 238. But is the power to keep peace also
the power to keep it successfully9 And a smilar question may be
asked as to the power to maintain prosperity
'Hirabayaslu v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94 (1943) "That
reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of our
national defense had ample ground for concluding that they must
face the danger of invasion cannot be doubted."
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missible, Chief Justice Stone summed up, because a large Japa-
nese population residing in the zone of danger was a circum-
stance relevant to defensive measures and imperative in the de-
termination of military plans.
The approach, then, was not one which brought into focus
the novel nature of the discrimination. 38 Rather, it treated the
issue as similar to previous cases before the Court where the war
power and individual civil liberties had been in conflict. Thus,
it simply sustained within a new context the view, never before
judicially accepted, that the power of government in war is un-
specifiedly large, yet highly relative to the time and the place
in which it is employed. Such a doctrine, however, has been
implicit in the acts of the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment.39 If such a statement of the elastic nature of the war
power is accepted, then the traditional statement that emergency
does not create new powers but calls dormant ones into use40 is
'The concurrences of Mr. Justices Douglas and Murphy how-
ever, emphasize the nature of the discrimination here, terming it"odious" They dealt, as Stone did not, with the contention that
individual administrative action was the only proper method for
testing loyalty suggesting that "peacetime procedures do not neces-
sarily fit wartime needs." Id. at 106.
See 4 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. RoOSE-
VELT 206-207 (1938) where the President, in commenting on the
decision in Schechter Corp. v United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
said at a press conference: "Some of us are old enough to remem-
ber the war days-the legislation that was passed in April, May
and June of 1917. Being a war, that legislation was never brought
before the Supreme Court. Of course, as a matter of fact, a great
deal of that legislation was far more violative of the strict interpre-
tation of the Constitution than any legislation that was passed in
1933. All one has to do is to go back and read those war acts which
conferred upon the Executive far greater power over human beings
and over property than anything that was done in 1933. But the
Supreme Court has finally ruled that extraordinary conditions do
not create or enlarge constitutional power! It is a very interesting
statement on the part of the Court!"
40See Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v Blaisdell, 290 U.S 398, at
425-26 (1934)
"Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not in-
crease granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions im-
posed upon power granted or received. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency Its grants of power to the
Federal Government were determined in the light of emergency
and they are not altered by emergency
"While emergency does not create power, emergency may-furnish
the occasion for the exercise of power. Thus the war power of
the Federal Government is not created by the emergency of war,
but it is a power given to meet that emergency It is a power to
wage war successfully and thus it permits the harnessing of the
entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to
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erroneous, for under conceivable circumstances, war or peace,
4 1
any of the provisions of the Constitution, whether general or par-
ticular, might be suspended. 4 2 In the past, the distinction be-
tween the two theories of war power has been unclear because
ordinarily it was claimed that some broad clause of the Con-
stitution, itself elastic, such as due process, had been violated.
But it is possible, for example, that Congress, under certain
compulsions of war, might extend its own term of office. Ac-
cording to the traditional conception of war power, such a statute
could never be held constitutional, whereas the implication in
the Hirabayashi case is that if the emergency were sufficiently
severe, the law would be sustained. Yet there is no need even to
take the road of speculation, for the allegations that evacuation
is a "lettre de cachet,'43 a "cruel and unusual punishment,"44
and a bill of attainder 45 can be seriously entertained. And the
Court, if it cares to deal with these problems, will be obliged to
decide whether very specific constitutional guarantees have been
violated, and if so, whether the violation should be upheld on
the ground of emergency
The only limitation upon this new theory of war power is
that the power exercised must never exceed the gravity of the
emergency which calls it forth. "It is an unbending rule of law
that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the
citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the
preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove con-
stitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties."
4The war power might better be termed "emergency power",
for no clear distinction between wartime and peacetime crisis can be
made. See 2 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSE-
VELT 15 (1938) "I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining
instrument to meet the crisis-broad executive power to wage war
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to
me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe." Such was the
statement of the President in his First Inaugural Address.
"Contra: ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120 et seq. (U.S. 1866)
"The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
c-nsequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any
of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of aovernment." But cf. Moyer v. Peabody 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909)
"When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter
irvolving' its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to
what he deems the necessities of the moment."
" Korematsu v. United States, 140 F. (2d) 295 (C.C.A. 9th 1943)
"Id. at 295.
1 See Cummings v Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U.S. 1866)
"These bills are generally directed against individuals by name;
but they may be directed against a whole class."
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exigency requires. "46 We need not quibble whether or not such
a doctrine is implicit in the Constitution. If it is necessary, in
order to satisfy the American lawyer's desire to depend on no
fundamental law but that represented by the Constitution, it can
be read into the Fifth Amendment, so that that Amendment,
usually considered by the judiciary as marking some absolute
limit for the use of power,4 7 becomes, according to the new in-
terpretation, not a minimum standard in an absolute sense, but
a measuring stick for determining the need of government and
allowing an authority sufficient for that need.
And it is evident that there can be no definite temporal
limitations upon the war power. War emergencies, as we have
seen in the years 1937 to 1941, exist before the declaration of
war, and the dangers, as we may see, are not entirely dispelled
by a treaty of peace. The Supreme Court has said of the war
power that it is "not limited to victories in the field and the dis-
persion of insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the
power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict,
and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and
progress. "48
In the past, the only practical restriction upon the power
to make war-although there have been, as we have seen, im-
portant doctrinal obstacles-has been the rule of ex parte Mil-
ligaU 49 that martial law "cannot arise from a threatened nva-
sion."5 ° And already in one case dealing with Japanese evacua-
tion, ex parte Venutra, 1 the Milligan rule has been criticized as
inadequate to meet the conditions of contemporary warfare
"In the Civil War when Milligan was tried by military commis-
sion no invasion could have been expected into Indiana except after
much prior notice. They never imagined the possibility of flying
lethal engines hurtling several hundred miles within an hour. They
4 Raymond v Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 716 (1875).
41See United States v Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88 (1921)
the decisions of this court indisputably establish that the mere
existence of a state of war could not suspend or change the opera-
tion upon the powers of Congress of the guarantees and limitations
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. " Contra: Miller v United
States, 11 Wall. 268, 304-05 (U.S. 1870) "if they are an exercise of
the war powers of government, it is clear they are not affected by
the restriction imposed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." Cf.
Tyler v Defrees, 11 Wall. 331 (U.S. 1870)
' Steward v Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 507 (U.S. 1870)
44 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1870)
Id. at 127.
"44 F Supp. 520 (W.D. Wash. 1942)
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never visioned the possibility of far distant forces dispatching an
armada that would ram destroying parachutists from the sky and
Invade and capture far distant territory over night. '
If by martial law is meant only the most extreme exercises
of war power, then the 31illigan case means nothing more than
the theory of war power here presented-there must be a need
for the use of extreme power in order that such power be consti-
tutionally employed. But generally it has been said that martial
law is a difference not of degree but of type. Thus in the
Hirabayash, case, Stone held that despite the severity of the
measures there was "no question of martial law -53 Such a find-
ing apparently denied the contention that the West Coast was
under de facto or qualified martial law54 and may, by implica-
tion, have given Supreme Court approval to the traditional view
that martial law must, by necessity, be formally declared and,
moreover, can only be declared when the civil courts are no longer
able properly to function.55 Yet it may be asked what use
martial law henceforward will have if the Supreme Court holds
that without it such extreme measures as a discriminatory curfew
and evacuation were permissible 9 If under a theory of war
power such regulation is constitutional, then the very concept of
martial law is outmoded and unnecessary A declaration of
urgent emergency will be as constitutionally efficacious as a
declaration of martial law
If, on the other hand, the newer concept that martial law is
elastic and can be qualified and may come into existence without
formal declaration 5 6 is accepted, there likewise appears no reason
I"Id. at 522.
320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943)
The great weight of opinion is that the Pacific region is not
now and never was under martial law. Contra: Graham, Martial
Law in California (1942) 31 Cal. L. Rev 6, 13. See also Brief for
State of California as Amicus Curiae in Hirabayashi v. United States,
No. 10,308 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 19 for a similar implication.
I See Franks v Smith, 142 Ky 232, 134 S.W 484 (1911), Bishop
v- Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W 278 (1924), WIENER, A PRAC-
TICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW (1940) 16.
1 The leading case advocating a recognition of qualified martial
law is Commonwealth ex rel Wordsworth v Shortall, 206 Pa. 165,
55 Atl. 952 (1903) Accord: In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706
(1899), In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914) State
ex rel Roberts v Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P (2d) 4 (1933), 1 BISHoP
CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) §52: "Martial law is elastic in its
nature, and easily adapted to varying circumstances. It may operate
to the total suspension or overthrow of the criminal authority; or
its touch may be light, scarcely felt at all by the mass of the people,
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to differentiate it from emergency power. Both, according to
our interpretation, are graduated, and both can be automatically
employed upon the advent of crisis.
Judge Dennan, in his concurrence in Korernatsui v United
States57 holds that the Milligan case is "not controlling because
implicit in its reasoning is the hypothesis that in the absence of
actual invasion the slower and more deliberate procedures of the
civil courts are a sufficient protection from disloyal citizens lend-
ing aid to the enemy, and because the possibility of air invasion
covering the state of Indiana in less than two hours was not even
'lurking' in the minds of the Justices." ' s But rather than
simply disregarding the Milligan case, Judge Denman in effect
said that we should keep one of the two tests of that decision-
threatening invasion. Yet the other test, that of the ability of
courts to function normally, should be eliminated, for " air
invasion, directed by saboteur signals in an hour's time
could destroy every federal court house in California. ,,59
But if the possibility of air invasion is made the standard for
the imposition of martial law, then, in effect, there is no practical
limitation, for in days of long-range planes any city in the
nation can be subjected to sudden attack with or without declara-
tion of war. Judge Denman's effort to save half of the Milligan
case is no more successful than attempts totally to reconcile it
with, or totally to distinguish it from, the curfew and evacuation
orders.
But in United States v Yasu?, 60 the second Yasum case, the
district court in re-sentencing the defendant after the Supreme
Court decision, held that "indicia of invasion have dis-
appeared." 6 ' Yet even as of July 14, 1943, the date of tis
decision, it would seem that an attempt, unsuccessful perhaps,
by the Japanese to invade the Pacific Coast, was not impossible,
certainly Pacific cities were still threatened with aerial bombard-
ment from carrier launched planes. What the court was really
while the courts go on in their ordinary course, and the business of
the community flows in its accustomed channels."
140 F.(2d)291-304(C.C.A. 9th, 1943)
MId. at 296.
: Id. at 296.
51 F Supp. 234 (D. Ore. 1943)
"Id. at 235.
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saying was that the emergency was no longer so serious as to
permit extremely discriminatory measures.
6 2
Similar results have obtained in two cases dealing with
"Individual Exclusion Orders" issued by Lieutenant General
Drum of the Eastern Military Command. In both Schueller v
Dru)0 3 and Ebel v Drum,6 4 district courts held that naturalized
citizens of German birth could not be excluded under Executive
Order 9066. In the former case, Judge Ganey seemed to take
judicial notice that normal civilian life was continuing on the
Atlantic seaboard, and in the latter case, Judge Ford said "I do
not believe in the light of conditions prevailing in the Eastern
Military Area in April of this year, there was present a reason-
able and substantial basis for the judgment the military author
ities made, i.e., that the threat of espionage and sabotage to our
military resources was real and imminent.'' Moreover, he
rested his decision on a broad basis of emergency, 66 distinguish-
ing the Hirabayashs case on the ground that "conditions in the
Western and Eastern Areas were radically different." 7
Thus, the lower courts have followed the practice of the
Supreme Court of in fact judging the degree of emergency
Yet they have not applied as their only test the standard of
"threatening invasion," although unwilling to dispense with it
altogether. To summarize, this standard was borrowed by the
Supreme Court from the Milligan case and applied to the
Japanese cases. And although the Court has been willing to
judge cases involving martial law and those involving general
That the court recognized the existence of less urgent cir-
cumstances, but nevertheless of an emergency can be seen from its
statement that "If defendant remain here, he will be kept under
close surveillance." Id. at 235. The implication was, apparently,
that although invasion is unlikely, the possibility of sabotage still
exists.
'This case is unreported. See No. 3161, E.D. Pa. 1943.
52 F Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 1943)
Id. at 197.
"Each case must be bottomed on its own facts, especially when
dealing with the nature of the power exercised here by the military
authorities. Appropriate action with respect to one type of restric-
tion in a situation at a certain time and place is not at all helpful
in determining the appropriateness of action at another time and
place unless the conditions and degree of restraint upon personal
liberty imposed are reasonably comparable. Military necessity will
vary materially in different localities and at different times and the
appropriate degree of restriction, not to be excessive, must bear a
reasonable relation to the degree of danger." Id. at 196.
" Id. at 196.
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war power by the same verbal formula, nevertheless it has con-
tinued the doctrinal distinction between the two legal concepts.
The theory of war power here presented in no way contro-
verts the view that although the determination of the military
is presumptively correct, it is reviewable by the courts.6s Sterling
v Constantin6 9 remains good law 70 And although on? court
has implied that the judgment of the military is conclusive as
to the degree of crisis, 71 yet if the existence of aiiv standard is
admitted, a court must, in order to apply it, investigate the
nature of that crisis. It is true, of course, that where funda-
mental liberties are at stake the discretion exercised by the
military will be given closer judicial scrutiny And indeed our
theory of war power assumes that the judiciary will, in periods
of emergency, be unwilling to approve usurpations of power, by
any group, which are unnecessary to meet the exigency 72 If that
'SSee Sterling v Constantin. 287 U.S. 378, 400-401 (1932) "It
does not follow from the fact that the Executive has this range of
discretion that every sort of action the Governor may take, no
matter how unjustified by the exigency or subversive of private
right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is con-
clusively supported by mere executive flat. The contrary is well
established. What are the allowable limits of military discretion
andwhether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case,
are judicial questions." See also Moyer v Peabody, 212 U.S. 79, 85
(1909) "No doubt there are cases where the expert on the spot
may be called upon to justify his conduct in court. But even
in that case great weight is given to his determination and the
matter is to be judged on the events as they appeared then and not
merely in the light of the event."
287 U.S. 278 (1932)
"OSee 140 F.(2d) 297-8(C.C.A. 9th, 1943).
Ex parte Kanai, 46 F Supp. 286, 288 (E.D. Wisc. 1942) "Neither
the general public nor the judges of our courts have any information
upon which they can properly base a conclusion as to the proper
necessary area to be included in military areas or defense zones."
The investigating committee of the Congress which enacted Public
Law 503 also refused the burden. Report of the Select Committee
Investigating National Defense Migration, H.R. Rep. 1911, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 13: "This committee does not deem its proper prov-
ince to encompass a judgment of the military need for the present
(and any subsequent) evacuation orders."
"It has been alleged, for example, that certain groups on the
West Coast used the war in order to solve a long existing racial
difficulty See McWilliams, Califorma and the Japanese (1942) 106
NEw REPUBLIc 295 for a careful analysis of the dangers and pres-
sures involved in Japanese evacuation; Brief for Appellant, Hira-
bayashi v. United States, No. 10,308 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 19: "It is
inconceivable, yet apparently true, that groups of persons who
parade as good American citizens would take advantage of the
condition of war to stir up a racial hatred and attempt to have their
selfish, mercenary and un-American prejudice satisfied in such an
inhuman manner."
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assumption is incorrect, then any discussion of war power is in
vain.
We have faith that "To each his need. from each his
power' 73 is a sufficiently intellectually valid and emotionally
stimulating doctrine to meet the two purposes of any statement
of law. The first and conscious aim is to provide certainty
Mr. Justice Cardozo has written
C4 there is certainty that is genuine and a certainty that is
illusory a symmetry that is worth attaining and a symmetry to be
shunned. One of the reasons why our law needs to be restated is
that judges strive at times after the certainty that is sham instead
of the certainty- that is genuine. Particular precedents are
carried to conclusions which are thought to be their logical develop-
ment. The end is not foreseen. Every new decision brings the judge
a little farther. Before long he finds hinself in a dilemma. He does
not like the spot where he is placed, yet he is unwilling and per-
haps unable to retreat from it. The certainty that is arrived at by
adherence to precedent is attained, but there is a sacrifice of another
certainty that is larger and more vital. This latter certainty is
lost if we view the law in shreds and patches, not steadily and
whole with a sweep that reaches the horizonj 4
An elastic conception of the war power allows for certainty
and predictability of a general sort, for while it is not an un-
inhibited doctrine of salus respublicae suprena lex,75 yet it
permits any constitutional provision to be ignored if, in the
future, we are faced with urgency If some day the nation is
confronted with a situation where national elections cannot be
held, then it is far more satisfying both to the legal and lay
mentality to have a constitutional doctrine which allows for their
suspension rather than interpreting the Constitution in such a
manner that we necessarily breach it. Such an interpretation
satisfies the second and unconscious aim, that of a myth.7 6 No
"AUDEN AND ISHERWOOD, THE DOG BENEATH THE SKIN (1936)
180.
" CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 17-18.
See FAiRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (1940) 27" "When
a movement-strike, racial unrest, or what not-threatens to destroy
the social or economic equilibrium of a community it will be resisted
instinctively, often frantically, by those whose position is menaced.
They have come to identify their own well-being with the public
good. If they control the government they will employ its power
to suppress the subversive movement."
See Note (1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev 265, 269; cf. Note (1942) 90
U.Pa.L.Rev 598, 601, n.30.
7'See BURNHAm, THE MACHIAVELLIANS (1943) 269; "A dilemma
confronts any section of the elite that tries to act scientifically The
political life of the masses and the cohesion of society do not permit
belief in the truth of the myths. But the leaders must profess, indeed
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
myth can continue to be believed if too frequently contradicted
by the facts. If the Supreme Court sustains the Japanese
evacuation without introducing some doctrinal explanation that
is a new myth, then the legend that republican government does
not permit public disciinnnations based upon race or nationality
will already twice have been found untrue and therefore
weakened3 7  And the broad generalization that inherent m
government is the power to meet need and the converse state-
ment of the same doctrine that emergency power may not be
exercised over and above the requirements of the emergency
make excellent social ideals.78
Be it admitted, however, that such a doctrine does not of
itself decide whether or not the evacuation orders should be
sustained by the Supreme Court.7 9 It merely overrules the
doctrinalizations derived from ex parte Milligan and makes
explicit what appears to have been the true rato decsdendi in
that case and in United States v. Hirabayasht.
foster, belief in the myths, or the fabric of society will crack and
they be overthrown."
,See, for example, N. Y. Times, June 20, 1943, sec. 4, p. 10,
col. 3: "Probably the chief black mark on the nation's record was the
wholesale imprisonment of Japanese and Nisei on the West Coast
without regard to whether the individual himself was disloyal."
For a general discussion of minority rights, see Lusky Minority
Rights and the Public Interest (1942) 52 YALE L. J. 1, Cushman,
Civil Liberties (1942) 37 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 49.
' Cf. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
(1937) 223: "Certain it is that the provisions of modern constitutions
for the establishment of temporary constitutional dictatorship and
the practice of constitutional governments in "neutralizing" the
armed forces seem woefully inadequate in times of crisis. Whether
effective changes can be brought about in the light of all this ex-
perience is a question beyond the judgment of the scientist. He can
merely exhort: Videant consules, ne respublica detrimentur n capiat."
'See (1943) 9 Town Meeting, No. 11 for the reprint of an intelli-
gent radio discussion between John M. Costello, Robert R. Gros,
Carey McWilliams, and Max Radin on the question whether there
should be continued exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the
Pacific Coast. See also Freeman, Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law
(1943) 28 CORN. L. Q. 414.
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